Introduction
A continuing concern amongst environmentalists is that expanded international trade may harm the environment. It is feared that competitive pressures generated by freer trade will force governments to relax their environmental policies in a "race to the bottom". The transboundary nature of many pollutants will make it even less likely that globally e¢ cient environmental policies are pursued by individual countries acting non-cooperatively. A growing body of literature has examined these concerns (see, for examples, Krutilla, 1991; Barrett, 1994; Kennedy, 1994; Antweiler, et al., 2001; Copeland and Taylor, 2003) . 1 While identifying situations where countries may strategically weaken their environmental regulations in order to capture additional gains from trade (labeled as the "rent capture" e¤ect), the literature has also pointed out other situations where trade can improve environmental quality. The latter can happen, for instance, as a consequence of higher demand for environmental quality that emerges as national income grows with international trade.
2
For the case where capital is immobile across countries, the rent capture e¤ect has been illustrated by Kennedy (1994a) . When …rms compete in terms of quantities, reducing domestic …rms'environmental costs makes them more competitive internationally, enabling a country to capture additional rents from its trading partners. Equilibrium pollution taxes can be subjected to other distortions as well. A desire to shift polluting production from itself to its trading partners can motivate a country to ine¢ ciently increase its pollution tax. Moreover, to the extent that pollution is transboundary, 1 Most of the literature on trade and environment has focused on consumption rather than production externalities. Some of the few papers that analyze pollution as a production externality in this context are Copeland and Taylor (1999) , and Benarroch and Thille (2001) .
2 Countries may also relax their environmental regulations in order to attract internationally mobile capital (Markusen, et al., 1995) . Conversely, strategic behaviour among trading countries can lead to tighter environment policies when imperfectly competitive …rms compete in terms of prices (Barrett, 1994). pollution taxes chosen by individual countries taking into consideration only their own pollution damage (but not that of other countries) will be set too low. Kennedy (1994a) concludes that, in a symmetric equilibrium, the net impact under free trade is a lowering of the pollution tax below its e¢ cient level. In a related paper, Kennedy (1994b) considers two policy instruments -a pollution tax and a production subsidy -and analyzes strategic incentives of trading countries to distort them from their e¢ cient levels.
While Kennedy identi…es how the equilibrium pollution tax may be distorted under free trade, Burguet and Sempere (2003) examine how trade liberalization (in the form of bilateral tari¤ reduction) a¤ects environmental policy and welfare by changing the various distortionary forces.
3 Using a model of bilateral trade with imperfect competition and local pollution, the authors show that trade liberalization can make environmental policy either more or less stringent, depending on various factors such as the convexity of the damage function and the emission intensity of output. On the one hand, by increasing output, trade liberalization increases marginal social cost of output, which tends to tighten environmental policy. On the other hand, lower tari¤s imply lower import (export) revenue (cost) which tends to make environmental policy more lax. The net impact on equilibrium environmental policy depends on the relative strength of these counteracting forces. Furthermore, Burguet and Sempere (2003) show that, when the environmental policy instrument is a pollution tax, marginal social cost is always less than price. Consequently, by increasing output, a bilateral tari¤ reduction always increases welfare of each country. While Burguet and Sempere consider purely local pollution, the present paper analyzes the impact of trade liberalization on pollution tax and welfare, when pollution is transboundary. Many pollutants (such as SO 2 , greenhouse gases, and toxic chemicals) impose detrimental externalities (e.g. acid rain, global warming, and pollution of the Great Lakes in North America) on countries that are di¤erent from the country where the pollutants originated. As a result, even in the absence of international trade, pollution taxes can be set too low when countries set their tax non-cooperatively. Much pollution in the world as such involves two international dimensions -international trade in polluting goods and the cross-boundary nature of the associated pollution. Taking into account both these dimensions, and their interaction, then becomes important for getting a fuller understanding of the impact of freer trade on environmental protection and welfare.
We use a model of bilateral trade with imperfect competition, and represent transboundary pollution by a parameter 2 [0; 1]. This "transboundary pollution parameter" is the fraction of pollution that spills over from one country to its trading partner. Di¤erent values of the parameter allow us to consider a continuum of cases ranging from strictly local pollution to perfectly transboundary pollution. The extent to which pollution is transboundary turns out to be a crucial determinant of the impact of trade liberalization on pollution tax and welfare. This is because the magnitude of the strategic distortions that the pollution tax is subjected to depends on the extent to which pollution crosses borders. In particular, the incentive of each country to increase its tax and shift polluting production to the other country becomes smaller when pollution is more transboundary in nature.
We …nd that when the pollution damage parameter is su¢ ciently small (large), liberalizing trade always decreases (increases) the pollution tax, irrespective of the value of the transboundary pollution parameter. In contrast, when the pollution damage parameter takes a low range of intermediate values (de…ned later), trade liberalization always decreases the optimal pollution tax for strictly local pollution but increases the tax if pollution is moderately transboundary. Alternatively, when the pollution damage parameter takes a high range of intermediate values, trade liberalization always increases the optimal pollution tax for strictly local pollution but decreases the tax if pol-lution is su¢ ciently transboundary. Further details of this result are provided in Proposition 1.
The impact of reducing tari¤ protection on the welfare of each country is also shown to depend on the extent to which pollution is transboundary. When pollution is purely local, we …nd that a bilateral tari¤ reduction always increases welfare (as in Burguet and Sempere (2003) ). However, when pollution is transboundary, welfare of each country is shown to be non-monotonic and concave in the tari¤ level. Marginal bilateral tari¤ reduction then improves welfare if and only if the initial tari¤ rate exceeds a threshold value, which itself is a positive function of the transboundary pollution parameter. An implication is that the (direction of) change in welfare of a country due to marginal bilateral reductions in the tari¤ rate may not be the same as that due to a discrete jump in tari¤ (to free trade, for example).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives the equilibrium. The e¤ect of bilateral trade liberalization on the optimal pollution tax and on welfare are analyzed in sections 3 and 4 respectively. Section 5 provides two numerical examples in support of our propositions. The last section concludes.
The model
Consider two identical countries, Home and Foreign, with segmented markets. There are n …rms in each country, with n 1. All …rms produce a homogeneous good and face a constant marginal cost of production, given by c: Each Home (Foreign) …rm sells x (y) units of the good in the Home market and x (y ) units in the Foreign market. Foreign variables are denoted by the superscript " ".
In each market, …rms compete in quantities, i.e. à la Cournot. Demand in each country is identical and given by:
where a > c; and q is total quantity sold in the relevant country. Each country charges a tari¤ at the same rate of z per unit of import from the other country. The tari¤ is given exogenously in our model, and trade liberalization takes the form of equal bilateral reduction in the tari¤ rate. This, for example, re ‡ects the situation subsequent to the signing of free trade agreements (such as CUSTA and NAFTA) between countries.
A by-product of production in this industry is pollution. It is assumed that, for every unit of output produced, the …rms emit one unit of pollution. 4 The pollution is transboundary and 2 [0; 1] fraction of pollution generated in one country a¤ects the other country. Di¤erent values of the "transboundary pollution parameter", ; allow us to consider a continuum of cases ranging from strictly local pollution ( = 0) to perfectly transboundary pollution ( = 1).
The damage from pollution is monotonically increasing and convex in the level of emissions a¤ecting a country. The damage functions in Home and Foreign are given by D and D respectively,
where 0 is the pollution damage parameter. In (1) and (2) ; n (x + x ) denotes the total production undertaken in Home and n (y + y ) the total production undertaken in Foreign. The environmental policy in each country is a tax imposed per unit of emission by domestic …rms. 5 The pollution (or emission) tax is denoted as t and t for Home and Foreign, respectively. The sequence of moves is as follows. In the …rst stage, (an environmental authority in) each country chooses its pollution tax to maximize the country's own welfare, taking the other country's pollution tax (and tari¤s in both countries) as given. In the second stage, each …rm takes the policies set by the countries and the output decisions of the (2n 1) other …rms as given, and maximizes its pro…ts. To obtain the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the model is solved by backward induction.
Second stage: Output decision of …rms
Let the total quantity sold in Home be Q = n (x + y) and that in Foreign be Q = n (x + y ) : Each Home …rm chooses x and x to maximize its pro…t
Similarly, each Foreign …rm chooses y and y to maximize its pro…t
The Cournot equilibrium quantities for the two markets are computed. The quantities sold in Home and Foreign are given by:
emission is equivalent to a tax per unit of the polluting good.
x = a c (n + 1) t + nt (n + 1) z 2n + 1
y = a c + nt (n + 1) t + nz 2n + 1
We assume that parameter values are such that each of the above quantities is positive. Total production in Home is n (x + x ), total consumption in Home is n (x + y) and, using (6) and (7), net import of Home is n (y x ) = n (t t ). Home's net import thus depends positively on Home's pollution tax and negatively on Foreign's pollution tax. Similarly, net import of Foreign is n (x y) = n (t t).
First stage: Optimal environmental policy
In the …rst stage of the game, each country chooses the pollution tax that maximizes its own welfare (the "optimal pollution tax"), taking as given the tari¤ level and the other country's pollution tax. 6 Social welfare is taken to be the sum of consumer surplus; producer surplus; tari¤ revenue and pollution tax revenue less pollution damage: In Home, social welfare, W; is given by
where consumer surplus CS = 1 2 (n (x + y)) 2 ; producer surplus P S = n x 2 + (x ) 2 ;
tari¤ revenue T R = zny, pollution tax revenue ER = tn (x + x ) ; and pollution damage D is as given by (1). The …rst order condition for welfare maximization, @W (t;t ) @t = 0; yields an expression for Home's optimal tax, t (t ), which is a function of Foreign's tax, t ; and the other parameters in our model. The second order condition for welfare maximization is satis…ed since we have the following:
In a symmetric equilibrium, where both countries are identical, the pollution tax of each country will be equal. Hence, imposing t = t in the expression for Home's optimal tax, t (t ) ; gives the Nash equilibrium optimal-tax in each country as
Three sources of market failure that in ‡uence the choice of the optimal pollution tax in our model are as follows. First, there is the "transboundary externality e¤ect" that tends to lower t (from its globally e¢ cient level), as each country ignores the impact of pollution created within its boundary on welfare in the other country. Second, there is the "rent capture e¤ect" that also works to lower the optimal pollution tax. Since the imperfectly competitive …rms enjoy rents, each government has a strategic incentive to provide a competitive advantage to its domestic …rms so that they are able to capture more foreign rent. Third, there is a "pollution-shifting e¤ect" (or a NIMBY, not-in-my-backyard, e¤ect) that tends to increase t, as each country tries to drive polluting production from itself to the other country.
The transboundary externality e¤ect and the pollution-shifting e¤ect depend on the extent to which pollution crosses jurisdictions. As increases from 0 to 1, the former e¤ect becomes stronger while the latter e¤ect becomes weaker. Note that when the good is clean (i.e. = 0), both these e¤ects are non-existent. Moreover, the rent capture e¤ect disappears when the market becomes competitive (i.e. as n ! 1). The optimal pollution tax (10) in such a case becomes
As long as there is positive tari¤, each country enjoys tari¤ revenue on imports and has to pay for exports. This gives them an incentive to substitute foreign production for domestic production, and consequently to tax domestic …rms (the "tari¤ e¤ect" on the optimal pollution tax). Only when trade is free (i.e. z = 0) as well, will the welfare-maximizing pollution tax rate (11) for each country be zero. The interaction of the above-mentioned e¤ects determines the choice of the optimal pollution tax. Note that, from (10), we have . Higher values of the transboundary pollution parameter, ; increases the optimal pollution tax, t, if and only if is su¢ ciently small.
In a symmetric equilibrium, substituting t = t = t in (5)- (8), we have total output produced equal to total output consumed in each country, so that its net import is zero. The total output, produced or consumed, in each country is Q = n (x + x ) = n (x + y) = 1 2 2 (n + 1) (a c z) + z (1 + ) (n + 1) + (1 n)
A bilateral tari¤ reduction leads to an increase in total output as 
Impact of bilateral tari¤ reduction on optimal pollution tax
The impact of bilateral tari¤ reduction on the previously mentioned e¤ects determines how reducing protection a¤ects the optimal pollution tax by altering the tradeo¤ between these e¤ects. As shown below, the extent to which pollution crosses borders plays a pivotal role in the determination of the net impact of these e¤ects.
The impact of bilateral trade liberalization on the optimal pollution tax is given by the sign of the following expression (derived using (10))
The denominator of (12) ; therefore, is the same as that of the numerator of (12), which is quadratic and convex in the transboundary pollution parameter . As such, the two roots in terms of that satisfy 
The above roots are real if and only if 
Notice that the above-de…ned threshold values of the pollution damage parameter are related as follows: 1 < 1 < 2 3 for all n 1. Proposition 1 follows.
Proposition 1: (i) Suppose the pollution damage parameter is small, i.e. < 1 . Then the roots of , as given by (13) and (14) Proposition 1 shows that when the pollution damage parameter is su¢ -ciently small (large), a bilateral tari¤ reduction always decreases (increases) the optimal pollution tax, irrespective of the value of the transboundary pollution parameter. However, when the pollution damage parameter takes intermediate values, bilateral trade liberalization is likely to reduce (increase) the optimal pollution tax for extreme (intermediate) The above results can be explained as follows. As output increases and price falls with trade liberalization, it increases the generation of and damage from pollution, but decreases rents. Consequently, a country's incentive to raise tax and drive out polluting production increases, but its incentive to lower tax and capture additional rents decreases. These exert an upward pressure on the optimal pollution tax. However, a lower tari¤ also reduces tari¤ revenues from imports and the cost of exports. This reduces the country's incentive to substitute foreign production for domestic production by increasing the tax. As a result, the optimal pollution tax tends to decrease. The net impact on the tax depends on the relative strength of the two counteracting forces.
The incentive for a country to raise its tax and drive out polluting production depends on both the pollution damage parameter as well as the transboundary pollution parameter. For instance, when pollution is largely harmless and/or largely transboundary in nature, each country has little incentive to drive out polluting production (either because pollution damage is too small or because pollution ‡ows back even when production moves out). Consequently, the pollution shifting e¤ect is weak and, with trade liberalization, the upward pressure (mentioned above) on the pollution tax is likely to be dominated by the downward pressure. Trade liberalization tends to lower the optimal pollution tax in such cases.
In the special case when pollution is purely local, using (12) with = 0, we have @t @z j =0 0 if and only if 2 . Thus, if the pollution damage parameter took a value such that 1 < < 2 , trade liberalization would always decrease the optimal pollution tax for strictly local pollution but will increase the tax if pollution is moderately transboundary (i.e. L < < H ).
Similarly, when 2 < < 3 , trade liberalization would always increase the optimal pollution tax for strictly local pollution but will decrease the tax if pollution is su¢ ciently transboundary (i.e. > H ). Ignoring the extent to which pollution crosses borders, while analyzing the impact of trade liberalization on optimal environmental policy, is therefore likely to lead to inaccurate conclusions.
Impact of bilateral tari¤ reduction on welfare
The maximized welfare of each country, denoted as W , can be derived by substituting t = t = t into W (t; t ), where t is the optimal pollution tax given by (10) and W (t; t ) is given by (9). Resultantly, we get
The e¤ect of bilateral trade liberalization on welfare is given by
The following result holds.
Proposition 2: In the presence of transboundary pollution, a marginal bilateral tari¤ reduction leads to an increase in the welfare of each country (i.e.
@W @z
0) if and only if the initial tari¤ rate z is su¢ ciently large (speci…cally z reduces price. Whether this increases welfare of a country, or not, depends on whether initially price exceeds marginal social cost of output, or not, in that country. When pollution is cross-boundary (i.e. > 0), Proposition 2 indicates that welfare is non-monotonic and concave in z. The turning point corresponds to the threshold value of tari¤, z 1 . It is only when tari¤ is su¢ ciently high (z > z 1 ), and the associated output su¢ ciently low, that price exceeds marginal social cost. An increase in output, that emerges as a result of bilateral tari¤ reduction, then increases welfare. The opposite result holds when z < z 1 :
Notice that the threshold value of tari¤, z 1 , is an increasing function of the transboundary pollution parameter (i.e. @z 1 @ > 0). An important policy implication arises: the more transboundary is pollution, the less likely it is that trade liberalization will improve welfare. In contrast, when pollution is purely local (i.e. = 0), trade liberalization always improves welfare as (18) implies 
Numerical analyses
In this section, we provide two numerical examples in support of our analytical results. for di¤erent values of and in Figure 1 provide validation for Proposition 1. It is interesting to note that, when = 1:06, reducing tari¤ protection decreases the optimal pollution tax if and only if the transboundary pollution parameter is su¢ ciently small (i.e. < 0:08) or su¢ ciently large (i.e. > 0:42).
In our symmetric equilibrium, when t = t = t, we have x = y and 95. Suppose the prevailing tari¤ rate is z = 1. Then the optimal pollution tax is t = 38: 37, quantities are x = y = 12: 73 and x = y = 11: 73, and welfare is W = 2247: 5. Moreover, from (18), we have 
Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of bilateral trade liberalization on the optimal pollution tax and welfare, when pollution is transboundary. Accounting for the cross-boundary nature of pollution is important because much of worldwide pollution exhibits such a characteristic. This tends to make non-cooperatively set pollution taxes ine¢ cient from a global perspective.
Within such a second-best world, we analyze how changing (reducing) one policy instrument, the tari¤ rate, changes the optimal value of another policy instrument, the pollution tax, and the associated welfare in symmetric countries. Such an analysis is topical in a world where the move towards freer trade has left countries with less control over their tari¤ policy. The latter, in turn, has motivated some countries to use environmental policy instruments in order to achieve trade policy objectives (Ederington and Minier, 2003) . The extent to which pollution is transboundary a¤ects the magnitude of the pollution shifting e¤ect and the tradeo¤ between this e¤ect, the rent capture e¤ect, and the tari¤ e¤ect. Liberalizing trade changes the tradeo¤, and is shown in the paper to a¤ect optimal pollution tax and welfare in ways that depend on the transboundary pollution parameter. We …nd that when the pollution damage parameter takes lower intermediate values, bilateral tari¤ reduction increases the pollution tax if and only if pollution is moderately transboundary. On the other hand, when the pollution damage parameter takes higher intermediate values, bilateral tari¤ reduction decreases the tax if and only if pollution is su¢ ciently transboundary (Proposition 1).
Further, when pollution is transboundary, we …nd that the impact of bilateral trade liberalization on welfare is non-monotonic and concave (Propo-sition 2). Marginal tari¤ reduction then improves welfare if and only if the initial tari¤ rate exceeds a threshold value. The more transboundary is pollution, the higher is this threshold value and the less likely it is that trade liberalization will improve welfare. Another implication for policy is that welfare changes due to marginal bilateral changes in the tari¤ may be an inaccurate predictor of welfare changes due to discrete jumps in tari¤ (to free trade, for example). For purely local pollution, however, trade liberalization always improves welfare.
Our paper examines the analytically simpler case of symmetric countries with linear demand. Nevertheless, the role of transboundary pollution in the determination of the impact of trade liberalization should remain crucial and qualitatively similar even when these simplifying assumptions are relaxed. 
